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INTRODUCTION
In the past several years there has been a resurgence in the movement
for more federal regulation of the internal affairs of the nation's most power-
ful corporations.' The proposals, described below, to effect such a change
raise questions ranging from basic issues of federalism to mechanical jurisdic-
tional problems. For example, Professor Cary's proposal to create federal
fiduciary standards for the managers of such corporations, to confer manda-
tory and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving such standards upon state
courts, and to subject such courts to review by lower federal courts,2 in-
volves a relationship between state courts and the federal government argu-
ably unprecedented in our 200 years under the Constitution. An example of
a more mundane problem is the possibility that exclusive federal chartering
-another proposed, less likely, and more drastic form of federalization of
corporate law-might well result in the abolition of a large amount of diver-
sity jurisdiction. 3 For those primarily interested in the quality of corporate
justice, even nonconstitutional jurisdictional questions have a subtle but vital
importance. An argument can be made, for example, that in order to insure
the highest quality of justice under new federal corporate law,4 suits under
some of its provisions should be cognizable exclusively in the federal courts. 5
These and other issues of federalism connected with federal corporate law
proposals are the subject of this article.
* Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. The author wishes to thank
Charles F. Corcoran, a third-year law student, for his unusually able assistance.
1. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976);
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Henning,
Federalism and Corporate Law: The Chaos Inherent in the Cary Proposal, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 362 (1976);
Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433 (1968); Note, Federal
Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. LJ. 89 (1972); Corporate Rights and Responsibilities:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 57 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings] (Statement of A. A. Sommer).
For a sampling of earlier consideration of federal incorporation see NADER, supra at 65-71, and
authorities cited in Kaplan, supra at 480-81 n. 127.
2. Cary, supra note 1, at 700-05.
3. See discussion part IB2b infra.
4. To be distinguished from the federal corporate law currently existing under the federal
securities law, but recently circumscribed by the Supreme Court. See note 101 infra, and accom-
panying text.
5. See discussion part IBIb infra.
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW
My interests run both to the study of federalism and to that of corporation
law. What follows immediately in this introduction, for those who join me
only in the former interest, is first, a description of the current state-law
dominated system of regulating the internal affairs6 of national corporations
and, second, a sketch of current proposals for increasing the regulatory role
of the federal government.
A. Current Regulation
Federal deference to state regulation characterizes the current system of
regulating the internal affairs of corporations with substantial interstate con-
nections. By "internal affairs" is meant those matters concerning domestic
corporations which states typically purport to govern by their business corpo-
ration laws.7 While such laws vary in content from state to state, they all deal
primarily with various relationships among shareholders, directors, and of-
ficers and to a lesser extent with the relationship of such groups to third
parties, particularly creditors. With the exception of matters concerning the
internal affairs of a very few corporations, such as national banking associ-
ations which hold federal charters,8 the federal government has not chosen to
make law governing the internal affairs of private business corporations, no
matter how extensive their connections with interstate commerce.
The concept that a person is subject to full in personam jurisdiction only
in a state where he is present or domiciled ultimately leads to tension with the
original conception of a corporation as a person located only in the state that
issued its corporate charter. 9 As long as corporations were, for the most part,
active only in the commerce of their chartering states, I0 the tension was more
theoretical than real. With the advent of numerous corporations active in in-
terstate commerce, their national nature was sensed by the courts, if not
clearly understood. Unlike natural persons, such corporations not only could
be, but were, "present" in several places at the same time.i" Where such pres-
ence was substantial, courts found additional forums with full in personam
jurisdiction.I2
Conceptually, matters might have proceeded differently. A corporation's
6. By "law governing internal affairs," I mean the law which determines the rights and duties
of officers, directors, and shareholders inter sese. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§
301-13 (1971) observe the distinction between laws governing the relationship of a corporation to
the external world and the law governing internal affairs. See id. § 313 Comments a & b. Compare
id. § 301 with §§ 302-10.
7. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
8. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
9. See E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 51 (1954).
10. Id. at 179.
11. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The concept of multiple
presence developed slowly. See R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL
PROCEDURE 677-79 (1973); DoDD, supra note 9, at 51, 174-78.
12. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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substantial presence in two or more states might have been made an opera-
tive fact triggering a federal scheme of internal affairs regulation. No such
choice was made and, as a result, at least theoretical choice-of-law questions
arose. Two or more state forums having general in personam jurisdiction
over any corporation had, as an apparent consequence, shared power to ren-
der judgments affecting its internal affairs. What limitations of reasonable-
ness, and even of constitutional law, are there upon the choices of law such
forums may make in deciding matters of the internal affairs of a corporation?
The limitations imposed by reasonableness involve the needs for planning
and for coherence. 3 Corporate shareholders, officers, and directors need
to know in advance of certain actions what laws will govern such matters as
whether preemptive rights exist, what is an appropriate record date for div-
idends, and whether shares can be voted cumulatively. 4 The need for
coherence is distinct from the need for certainty. Even were it to be predict-
able in advance, the application of differing substantive laws to parts of cer-
tain transactions often would be undesirable. For example, the application of
one state's cumulative voting rule and another's straight voting rule to differ-
ent shareholders voting in the same corporate election of directors would lead
to results undesirable under any theory.
Such potential conflict-of-laws problems have rarely caused difficulty.
Courts which take jurisdiction of suits involving the internal affairs of a cor-
poration incorporated in another state have sensed the need for certainty and
coherence in the choice of such law and have used the bright-line solution of
applying the law of the state of incorporation.1 5 The exceptions are, for the
13. See note 15 infra.
14. For an example of a provision creating preemptive rights see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 622
(McKinney 1963). For an example of a provision defining appropriate record dates see id. § 604
(McKinney 1963). For an example of a provision permitting cumulative voting see id. § 618
(McKinney 1963).
15. For the proposition that most American courts have followed this bright-line solution see
Kaplan, supra note 1, at 440. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS generally accepts such
a rule (§ 302(1) & (2)) arguing for it as follows in Comment c:
Rationale. Application of the local law of the state of incorporation will usually be sup-
ported by those choice-of-law factors favoring the needs of the interstate and interna-
tional systems, certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, protection of the jus-
tified expectations of the parties and ease in the application of the law to be applied.
Usually, application of this law will also be supported by the factor looking toward im-
plementation of the relevant policies of the state with the dominant interest in the deci-
sion of the particular issue.
Uniform treatment of directors, officers and shareholders is an important objective
which can only be attained by having the rights and liabilities of those persons with
respect to the corporation governed by a single law. To the extent that they think about
the matter, these persons would usually expect that their rights and duties with respect
to the corporation would be determined by the local law of the state of incorporation.
This state is also easy to identify, and thus the value of ease of application is attained
when the local law of this state is applied.
In addition, many matters involving a corporation cannot practicably be determined
differently in different states. Examples of such matters, most of which have already
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most part, predictable and include suits involving the internal affairs of
pseudoforeign corporations and other suits where the needs for certainty and
coherence pale next to the forum's interest in applying its own corporate
law. 1 6 Earlier in this century the Supreme Court occasionally invalidated, on
constitutional grounds, a choice of law made by a state court; but there has
never been a Supreme Court case invalidating a state's choice of the law to
govern the internal affairs of a classical business corporation. 7 The absence
of such a case may be attributable to state courts' faithfully employing the
"law of the state of incorporation" conflicts rule. Had state courts not behaved
so reasonably in choosing to apply to the internal affairs of a corporation the
law of its chartering state, there would have been numerous serious chal-
lenges. Had the ability of shareholders, officers, and directors of interstate
corporations to plan their actions in light of a certain and coherent set of
rules ever been seriously jeopardized, interstate commerce in turn would have
been severely harmed and the federal government would have had two op-
tions: The first would have been a federalization of the corporate law relating
to such corporations; the second would have been to define federal constitu-
tional limitations upon permissible choice of state corporate law.
The lack of a federal corporate law to govern the internal affairs of inter-
state corporations-at least the largest of them-seems a result of the evolu-
tion of this country's commerce. In the early days of the Republic, corpora-
tions were largely intrastate enterprises.' 8 Slowly more corporations became
been mentioned in Comment a, include steps taken in the course of the original incorpo-
ration, the election or appointment of directors and officers, the adoption of by-laws,
the issuance of corporate shares (see Comment f), the holding of directors' and share-
holders' meetings, methods of voting including any requirement for cumulative voting,
the declaration and payment of dividend and other distributions, charter amendments,
mergers, consolidations, and reorganizations, the reclassification of shares and the
purchase and redemption by the corporation of outstanding shares of its own stock.
But see Kaplan, supra note 1, at 476.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS at § 302, Comment g. See also Western
Airlines v. Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. App. 1961).
17. An example of the Supreme Court's invalidation of a state's choice of law is Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See generally R. J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS, Chapter 9 (1971). The theory of the cases invalidating states' choices of law has been
predicated upon the due process or full faith and credit clauses, but not upon the commerce
clause.
While the Supreme Court has never invalidated a state's choice of the law to govern the inter-
nal affairs of a classical business corporation, it has done something quite similar in the context of
fraternal benevolent associations. In four cases decided between 1915 and 1948, the Supreme
Court invalidated a state's refusal to apply to the internal affairs of such associations the law of
their respective jurisdictions of organization or incorporation. Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the
World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544
(1925); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915). There is at least
some doubt as to the continued viability of such cases, see R. J. WEINTRAUB, supra this note, at
410.
18. DODD, supra note 9, at 179.
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truly interstate in operations. Because there never was a dramatic beginning
of an age of interstate corporations, state regulatory schemes continued to
govern them. As we have seen, the states have used the old models with in-
genuity, developing their own unofficial federalism by means of parallel
choice-of-law rules.'
9
Of course, we cannot conclude that the regulation of activities which de-
veloped gradually should be changed simply because the regulation would be
different if the activities had developed all at once. A system designed for the
regulation of corporations conceptually linked to particular states has been
adjusted to permit a reasonably intelligent accommodation to the change in
the nature of corporations. The development of the prevailing choice-of-law
rule described above is evidence of that.
B. Recent Proposals for More Federal Corporate Law
The current impetus for more federal corporate law has come entirely
from those who feel that the current state-oriented system of regulating truly
national corporations-those with substantial interstate operations and a
nationwide shareholder constituency-is perverse. 20 The focus of the critics is
not primarily upon the abstract abdication of federal responsibility inherent in
the current state-oriented system, but rather upon how poorly the states have
discharged their responsibility. Weak state substantive laws are seen as no ac-
cident. The current system is perverse not merely because it permits the states
to regulate national corporations but also because it contains built-in incen-
tives for the states to regulate in a way designed to ignore the interests of
small investors.
Under the current system, except in unusual circumstances, the law of the
state under which a corporation has been incorporated governs the relations
inter sese of stockholders, directors, and officers. 2' There are no federal limita-
tions determining in what state a business may incorporate; indeed a business
may incorporate in a state where it has no connections of any sort.2 2 While
there are limitations upon the taxes which may be charged by a state where a
corporation is not chartered, 2 a state is free to charge a corporation large
19. See note 15 supra.
20. See, e.g., NADER, supra note 1, at 43-61, 246; Cary, supra note 1, at 663-92; Kaplan, supra
note 1, at 437, 476-81; Hearings, supra note 1, at 57-58 (Statement of A. A. Sommer), 241-46
(Statement of H. Goldschmid), 333 (Statement of D. Vagts).
21. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 440. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 301-13
(1971).
22. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 435 n.4 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hipikle, 278 U.S. 460 (1928) (striking down a state's an-
nual tax upon foreign corporations based upon their authorized capital stock). Taxes on foreign
corporations must generally be apportioned to the amount of business done within the taxing
state. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439-42 (1963), reh. den., 379 U.S. 875
(1964).
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annual fees for the privilege of holding a corporate charter and the con-
comitant benefit of having that state's laws rule its internal affairs. 24 Critics of
the current system of regulation claim that those who control national corpo-
rations shop for corporate law favorable to them and that this, for the most
part, means shopping for internal rules which benefit controlling interests by
reducing the rights of small investors and others.25 The rest of the tale, ac-
cording to the critics, is that the sellers of corporate law are only too pleased
to accommodate the buyers by continuously improving their product to make
it competitively promanagement.2 6 The competition among states to make
their corporate laws attractive to the management has been described by a
distinguished scholar of corporation law as "the race to the bottom.
27
The common element of the proposed alternatives to the current system is
a concern for the welfare of noncontrolling shareholders. 28 Some proponents
of a larger federal role in the governance of national corporations would go
further, extending corporate legal protection to employees, creditors, and so-
ciety at large, 29 classes of persons who are the beneficiaries of few rights
under current state business corporation law."' While the areas of substantive
difference among the proponents' regulatory schemes suggest an infinite
number of possible legislative packages, the structural differences suggest two
models: (1) retention of the current system with some new federal regulation
superimposed 3' or (2) exclusive federal chartering and comprehensive regula-
tion of the internal affairs of national corporations.32
The proponents of more federal regulation agree that the most likely ob-
jects of such new laws are this nation's largest, most powerful corporations.3"
24. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 501, 503 (1975 & Supp. 1976) providing that only domestic
corporations pay an annual franchise tax based upon authorized capital stock.
25. See NADER, supra note 1, at 663-70.
26. NADER, supra note 1, at 54-61; Cary, supra note 1, at 668-92.
27. Cary, supra note 1, at 705.
28. NADER, supra note 1, at 75-118, 254; Cary, supra note 1, at 902; Henning, supra note 1, at
362-67; Kaplan, supra note 1, at 478-80; Note, supra note 1, at 113-21; Hearings, supra note 1, at
58 (Statement of A. A. Sommer).
29. NADER, supra note 1, at 181-236, 245, 253-54.
30. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW (McKinney 1963);
Hearings, supra note 1, at 57 (Statement of A. A. Sommer).
31. The main substantive features of Cary's proposal are presented in note 57 infra. Nader's
proposal is also one of joint state-federal regulation. NADER, supra note 1, at 239-40. Indeed,
while Nader proposes federal chartering, he proposes that state chartering be retained as well. Id.
at 239-40.
32. See proposal of A. A. Sommer, note 59 infra.
33. Cary proposes that his scheme of partial federal regulation apply to all corporations hav-
ing more than $1 million in assets and 300 shareholders, noting that such a scope would parallel
the American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code. Cary, supra note 1, at 701. This
selective test seems to be the product of practical political considerations since Cary states clearly
that it might be preferable to apply his mode of regulation to "all public companies engaged in or
affecting interstate commerce." Id. 702-03.
Other proponents seem satisfied with a fairly selective test for the selection of corporations to
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References made below to "national corporations" are to this nation's wealth-
iest corporations whether defined with reference to Fortune's annual listing or
by some other similar definition. 34
This article does not deal with the question of whether state laws regulat-
ing national corporations are so inadequate substantively as to warrant federal
intervention. That task has been performed admirably by others. Instead, this
article deals with matters of jurisdiction and federalism which should be con-
sidered by any legislator who has preliminarily decided that some federal in-
tervention is justified by the substantive inadequacy of state regulation.
Part I deals with a host of jurisdictional issues which would be raised by
various proposals for more federal regulation. Because, for the most part,
both the partial-regulation model and the total-federal-preemption model
discussed above raise the same issues to different degrees, they will be dis-
cussed together except where context indicates separate discussion. Part II,
the concluding portion of this article, deals briefly with problems of
federalism which should to some extent influence the precise scope of any
federal regulation proposed to remedy the inadequacy of state law.
I
JURISDICTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
UNDER A NEW FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW
A. Federalization and the Caseloads of the Lower Federal Courts
Under Existing Jurisdictional Grants
In order to consider the potential effect of a new federal corporate law for
national corporations upon the caseloads of the lower federal courts, it is use-
ful to discuss separately those effects attributable to federalization alone and
those attributable to the difference between the substantive content of such a
law and that of current state law. To isolate the former effects we must as-
sume, with respect to whatever federal law we are discussing, that its content
is identical to that of the state law it supplants. It would seem natural to
suppose that the mere federalization of any aspect of corporate regulation
would have the effect of increasing the caseload of the lower federal courts by
an amount equal to the litigation which would have been previously main-
be federally regulated. They propose: NADER (sales of $250 million or 10,000 employees during
any of the previous three years), supra note 1, at 240-41; Henning ("the top 200 to 500 corpora-
tions" using criteria similar to those defining size for purposes of earlier wage and price control
regulations), supra note 1, at 370-71; Note, supra note 1, at 98-99 (New York Stock Exchange
listing test: $14 million in assets and more than 3000 shareholders). A. A. Sommer would have
Congress completely preempt state law including the state chartering process with respect to cor-
porations having more than 500 shareholders and $1 million in assets. See his testimony before a
Senate committee quoted in note 59 infra.
34. It would include all corporations chosen by criteria described as "fairly selective" in note
33 supra.
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tained under the identical state standard. To make a more precise guess
about the effect of any particular scheme of federalization upon the jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts, more analysis is necessary. This is true be-
cause some claims arising under current state corporation laws are presently
cognizable in the federal courts.
First, notwithstanding recent limitations, many state-law claims continue to
be maintainable in federal court as pendent to federal securities laws claims
which arise from identical or overlapping facts.15
Second, many suits arising under state business corporation laws are main-
tainable in federal court pursuant to the diversity-of-citizenship jurisdictional
grant. 36 This is particularly true of derivative suits brought on behalf of a
national corporation against management or controlling shareholders for
breach of fiduciary responsibilities. 37 Such suits are extremely unlikely to be
brought at all if the corporation does not have a substantial chance of recover-
ing or saving more than $10,000.38 If the corporation has a financial interest
of more than $10,000 in such litigation, a federal district court has subject-
matter jurisdiction to hear a derivative suit brought by any shareholder with
diverse citizenship, regardless of the extent of his shareholding. 39 Similarly,
35. For examples of state-law claims heard by federal courts because they were pendent to
claims under the securities laws see Klaus v. Hi-Sheer Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 231 (9th Cir. 1975);
Kasner v. H. Hentz & Co., 475 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973);
Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 124.1-42 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970);
Strahan v. Pedroni, 387 F.2d 730, 731 (5th Cir. 1967); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir.
1961). My conclusion that the Supreme Court has recently narrowed the possibility of such pen-
dent jurisdiction is based upon the following analysis. First, while a doubtful federal cause of
action asserted by plaintiff is sufficient to make available pendent jurisdiction over a related
state-law claim even though plaintiff's view of federal law is ultimately rejected (see United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 728 (1966); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946) (Stone, C. J.,
dissenting)), a clearly insubstantial one is not sufficient (Warrington Sewer Co. v. Tracy, 463 F.2d
771 (3d Cir. 1972); Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969)). Included as insub-
stantial federal causes of action are those clearly foreclosed by previous decisions of the Supreme
Court or otherwise wholly without merit. Levering & G. Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933).
Second, after Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) a larger number of
securities law cases are clearly foreclosed by previous decision of the Supreme Court. See discus-
sion note 101 infra and accompanying text.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). For examples of state-law derivative suits maintained in federal
courts pursuant to diversity jurisdiction see Himmelblau v. Haist, 195 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Niesz v. Gorsuch, 295 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961); Topik v. Catalyst Research Corp., 339 F.
Supp. 1102 (D.C. Md. 1972); Irwin v. West End Development Co., 342 F. Supp. 687 (D.C. Colo.
1972); Dowd v. Front Range Mines, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 591 (D.C. Colo. 1965); Weinstock v. Kallet,
11 F.R.D. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
37. Sullivan, The Federal Courts as an Effective Forum in Shareholders' Derivative Actions, 22 LA. L.
REV. 580, 603 (1962). The amount-in-controversy test applies solely to the interest of the corpora-
tion. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. See Koster v. American Lumbermens' Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518
(1947) (decided under predecessor rule 23(b)); rule 23.1 did not change the substance of rule
23(b) and under the current rule the jursdictional amount requirement is satisfied if there is a
substantial claim that the corporation has suffered damage in excess of $10,000. C. WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS 358, 360-61 (3d ed. 1976).
38. Sullivan, supra note 37, at 596.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). Its requirement of diverse citizenship is met only if the citizen-
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the significant subject-matter jurisdictional barriers to a defendant's removal
of a derivative suit are (1) the nondiversity of the parties 4° or (2) the fact
that one of the defendants has been sued in his own domicile.4 I As a conse-
quence, it is primarily the citizenship pattern of parties which will eliminate
the possibility of federal diversity jurisdiction for either plaintiffs or defen-
dants in derivative suits. Federalization of the laws defining the fiduciary re-
sponsibilities of management and controlling shareholders to national corpo-
rations will increase the caseload of the lower federal courts by the number
of cases in which a party to a derivative suit which could be maintained in
state court prefers a federal forum but cannot demonstrate the requisite di-
versity of citizenship. 42
ship of each party defendant is diverse from that of each party plaintiff. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). For purposes of determining the existence vel non of diversity, only
the citizenship of the representative plaintiff shareholder is considered. See Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S. 332, 340 (1969); Winegar v. First Nat'l Bank, 267 F. Supp. 79 (M.D. Fla. 1967). It is possible
however that more stringent federal procedural requirements-as to the need for demands upon
shareholders and as to the need for plaintiffs' stock ownership at the time of the wrong
alleged-might also screen out of federal court some derivative suits maintainable in state court
even though the requirements of diverse citizenship and jurisdictional amount are satisfied. See
WRIGHT, supra note 37, at 358-60, concerning the unsettled applicability of such federal rules to
diversity-based derivative suits.
40. See discussion note 39 supra.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970) forbids removal of such an action. Barrier (2) discussed in text
above is in a sense a special case of barrier (1).
42. Of course beyond establishing diversity jurisdiction, a party seeking a federal forum must
find one which (i) has proper venue and (ii) can reach all practically necessary parties with pro-
cess. The difficulties of finding such a forum are described in the next paragraph of this note.
Note, however, that unless an unusually generous service-of-process and/or venue provision were
to accompany federal regulation of national corporations, the combined venue-process difficulties
in derivative suits brought under federal law would be at least as great as those currently beset-
ting plaintiffs in diversity derivative suits. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (c) (1970) are more generous in
providing venue for diversity cases than for federal-question cases and FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7), (f)
do not distinguish between the two sorts of cases in defining the process-reach of federal district
courts. Note, however, that the effect of the nationwide service-of-process provision which is
likely to accompany any new federal corporate regulatory program (see Cary, supra note 1, at
702) would completely eliminate the obstacles described in the next paragraph and greatly al-
leviate some of the inconvenience which currently exists even when there is a forum with venue
which can reach all necessary parties.
Currently 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (c) (1970), in effect, specify four proper venues of derivative
suits brought pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. They are the judicial districts where (i) all plain-
tiffs reside, (ii) all defendants reside, (iii) the claim arose, or (iv) the corporation might have sued
the same defendants. In at least some cases there will be no federal court which both (i) has
proper venue and (ii) can reach all practically necessary parties with process. There are severe
limitations upon the process-reach of any federal district court in diversity cases. FED. R. Civ. P.
4(f) limits such reach to the territorial limits of the state in which the district court sits and, in
some instances, beyond, as far as within 100 miles of the place where the action is commenced.
Additionally, rule 4(d)(7) provides for service in any manner sufficient under state law, giving the
court the benefit of any valid state long-arm statute. See WRIGHT, supra note 37, at 306-07. It is
surprising, however, how few states subject nonresident officers and directors of domestic corpo-
rations to in personam jurisdiction for any breach of fiduciary responsibility. The statutes existing
as of 1968 are collected in G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 714 n.53 (1959 &
1968 Supp.).
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While only the requirement of diverse citizenship currently screens deriva-
tive suits out of the federal courts, as a result of Supreme Court decisions
defining the relationship of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to jurisdic-
tional amount requirements, individual shareholder suits will face the addi-
tional and formidable hurdle of the amount-in-controversy requirements. 43 In
order to maintain an individual suit, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal
financial interest of more than $10,000 in the litigation.44 Additionally, a
diversity-based class action is possible only if every class member has more
than a $10,000 personal interest in the outcome of the litigation.45
To the extent that either the citizenship requirement or the jurisdictional
amount requirement currently screens suits to vindicate individual rights
under state corporate law, the federalization of such rights by means of a
statute supplanting state law would open the district courts to them. While the
general grant of jurisdiction over suits arising under the laws of the United
States is itself limited by a $10,000 amount requirement, 46 suits to enforce
duties created by federal corporate law would be cognizable without regard to
the amount in controversy by virtue of 28 U.S.C. section 1337. Section 1337
confers upon federal district courts jurisdiction over suits arising under any
act of Congress regulating interstate commerce.4 7 As section 1337 has been
interpreted, it confers jurisdiction over any suit to enforce a duty created by
an act of Congress if such act is grounded to some substantial extent upon
Congress' power under the commerce clause. 48 Were Congress to regulate
national corporations' internal affairs in a fairly comprehensive manner but to
make no special provision concerning jurisdiction, 49 a great many suits to vin-
dicate small individual claims would become subject to original federal
jurisdiction.5 Because the recent Supreme Court cases narrowing federal
43. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969).
44. 394 U.S. at 337.
45. 414 U.S. at 301.
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1976).
47. The full text of that statute reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding aris-
ing under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce
against restraints and monopolies.
48. Wenningham v. HUD, 512 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Leonardis v. Local 282
Pension Trust Fund, 391 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (suit charging violation of 1974 Employee
Retirement Income Security Act); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 349 F. Supp.
696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
49. Congress could impose an amount-in-controversy requirement; it has almost complete
power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441
(1850). There may be, however, some limitations. See Eisenberg, infra note 81; Hart, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Lower Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362
(1953). For possible limits more germane to the topic of this article see discussion at note 77 infra
and accompanying text.
50. Any cause of action arising directly or fairly inferable from an act of Congress itself con-
ferring rights upon shareholders would be maintained in federal court without respect to dollar
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class action jurisdiction relied upon the jurisdictional amount requirements, 5'
these cases would impose no limitations upon class actions brought to vindi-
cate federal rights of classes of shareholders of national corporations.
Given the current record keeping system of the federal district courts 52 it
is impossible, without reading the pleadings in several hundred cases, to guess
the extent to which federal jurisdiction is presently both available and em-
ployed with respect to claims arising under current state corporate law. It is
clear that the inevitable large increase in lower federal court caseloads due to
federalization of duties running to the corporation should be discounted
somewhat to account for what must be an appreciable amount of currently
available diversity jurisdiction. 3 It is also clear that the increase in federal
district court caseloads attributable to the federalization of duties running to
individual shareholders could be great and should be discounted substantially
less because diversity jurisdiction is currently less frequently available in such
actions.
While the increase in the caseloads of the federal courts resulting solely
from a shift to a federal regulating authority might well be dramatic, the
accompanying change in the substance of the regulation would also cause a
significant increase. 54 Laws which create new duties enforceable by private
damage actions result in increased judicial burdens. Our experience with civil
damage actions under rule lOb-5 is a prime indication that a dramatic in-
crease is to be expected. 5
5
amount. See Garrett v. Time-D.C., Inc., 502 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1974); Murphy v. Colonial Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967). Under exclusive federal regulation, even
causes of action to enforce rights arising from optional charter provisions might well be found to
be fairly inferable from the structure of a federal business corporation law of the enabling vari-
ety. Cf Murphy v. Colonial Federal Savings and Loan, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967), which ap-
pears to recognize the proposition that the rights of shareholders of national corporations are to
be determined by a federal common law (at 612 n.2) and that a claim under such law is a suffi-
cient predicate of federal jurisdiction under § 1337 (at 614-15). Query whether, in the context of
exclusively federally chartered and regulated corporations, a shareholder agreement external to
the corporate charter would arise under a federal common law dealing with such contracts.
51. See notes 43 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
52. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
1976 presents separate caseload figures for the category "stockholder suits and partnership disso-
lution." Such figures, however, include only suits predicated upon contract theory. Id. 293. The
number of such suits commenced in 1975 and 1976 respectively are zero and one. Id. A call to the
office of the Clerk for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
confirms that all derivative suits are not reflected in such figures.
53. See Sullivan, supra note 37, at 603.
54. As noted in footnote 7 supra and accompanying text, those who advocate more federal
regulation of national corporations do so because of a perceived need for a major change in the
substance of the law that governs the internal affairs of national corporations.
55. While I know of no study of the volume of litigation under rule lOb-5, the 246 pages of
annotations to § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act appearing in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j and 1977
pocket part offer ample testimony to its great magnitude. While some cases appearing in such
annotations involve only section 10a of the Securities Exchange Act, the vast preponderance arise
under section l0b and subsidiary rule lOb-5.
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In the section which follows, this article deals with possible congressional
response to such an increase.
B. Allocation of Jurisdiction Under Federal Corporation Law
1. General Considerations
The analysis presented above assumes a congressional substantive program
without its own tailormade jurisdictional provisions. What would be the best
way for Congress to allocate possibly increased jurisdiction under federal cor-
porate law in light of (1) the need for sound judicial development of any such
body of law, (2) the familiar strident complaints about the already onerous
federal court workloads, and (3) the interests of the states? I will start with
Cary's proposal to deal with pressures against increased federal caseloads by
creating exclusive state-court jurisdiction over cases arising under new federal
corporate laws.56 After concluding that such exclusive jurisdiction would be
unwise, I will discuss the remaining legislative choices: concurrent state-
federal jurisdiction or exclusive federal jurisdiction. Cary's minimum-stan-
dards proposal is a good example of what the substance of a partial federal
regulatory scheme might be. His description of its substantive features is
quoted in the footnote hereto. 5 7 The discussion which follows below is, how-
ever, equally applicable to problems of allocation of jurisdiction under
schemes of more comprehensive regulation like that proposed by Nader58 or
to problems of federal chartering and complete federal preemption like that
proposed by A.A. Sommer.5 9
56. See Cary, supra note 1, at 704-05.
57. The proposal is to continue allowing companies to incorporate in the jurisdiction of
their choosing but to remove much of the incentive to organize in Delaware or its rival
states. Such companies, nevertheless, must be subject to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts under certain general standards. To illustrate, some of the major provisions of
such a federal statute might include (1) federal fiduciary standards with respect to direc-
tors and officers and controlling shareholders; (2) an "interested directors" provision
prescribing fairness as a prerequisite to any transaction; (3) a requirement of certain
uniform provisions to be incorporated in the certificate of incorporation: for example,
authority to amend by-laws, initiate corporate action or draw up the agenda of share-
holders' meetings shall not be vested exclusively in management; (4) a more frequent
requirement of shareholder approval of corporate transactions, with limits placed upon
the number of shares authorized at any one time; (5) abolition of nonvoting shares; (6)
the scope of indemnification of directors specifically prescribed and made exclusive; (7)
adoption of a long-arm provision comparable to § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act to
apply to all transactions within the corporate structure involving shareholders, directors,
and officers.
The foregoing suggestions do not pretend to offer a complete model for a minimum
standards act. Indeed it can scarcely be expected that even these would survive political
pressure unscathed.
Cary, supra note 1, at 702 (footnotes omitted).
58. NADER, supra note 1.
59. In recent hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce the follow-
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a. Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction
Near the end of his proposal for the partial federal regulation of national
corporations, Cary states: 0
Concern over the growth of federal litigation is a separate issue. If this is a
matter of crucial importance, and if the grant of concurrent jurisdiction
would be futile because plaintiffs typically would sue in the federal courts,
then I would propose that the federal standards written into corporation law
be subject initially to state court interpretation, with some form of certiorari
jurisdiction on the part of the courts of appeal to achieve uniformity. If
necessary, there could be a special corporate court to handle such cases.
Cary is not proposing exclusive state jurisdiction as an essential or even desir-
able part of his scheme of substantive regulation. 1 He is, however, proposing
ing exchange occurred between Senator John A. Durkin of New Hampshire and A. A. Sommer,
formerly a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Senator DURKIN. I gather that you would favor a more restrictive Federal law.
Mr. SOMMER. Yes.
In the remainder of my prepared statement, which I omitted because of time consid-
erations, I state there is a lot to be said for a Federal corporation law that would be of an
"enabling" sort, similar to those that exist in States, and I would hope that one of the
more enlightened States would be the model for it.
There is a desirability in a uniform set of standards to be developed through statutory
law and in cases concerning the relationships between managers, directors, and share-
holders. I feel that burdening that sort of statute with a number of regulatory provisions
that would apply only to large corporations is not sound policy. I think those regulatory
provisions, such as concern for environment, concern for labor, concern for equal em-
ployment, should be dealt with across the board and be binding upon all businesses and
all corporations. I think they should be dealt with separately from the question of what is
the desirable configuration for corporate law.
Senator DURKIN. The corporate law, to allow for pollution, but allow the criminal law
dealing with bribery-
Mr. SOMMER. Deal with them separately but reasonably, as has been done in most
cases.
I think mixing those matters with corporation law which is designed to deal with the
relationship between managers, directors, and shareholders and the procedural matters
of how to hold meetings and that sort of thing, is undesirable.
Senator DURKIN. Would you recommend preempting State law?
Mr. SOMMER. With regard to a corporation that would be subject to Federal corpora-
tion law, yes. I think some sort of cut should be made. In other words, corporations of
only a certain size would be required to incorporate under Federal law. As you probably
know, at the present time, the corporations that have more than 500 shareholders and
$1 million of assets are required to file a periodic report with the SEC.
A similar kind of discrimination, I think, would be appropriate with regard to Federal
corporation law.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 57.
60. Cary, supra note 1, at 704-05.
61. Indeed at one point Cary seems to suggest that, in the absence of resistance from those
concerned about lower-federal-court caseloads, the lower federal courts would have a significant
role to play. Compare Cary, supra note 1, at 702, 1st sentence, 2d full paragraph with the quotation
from Cary's article presented immediately above in the text of this article. The precise meaning
of the former is, however, not completely clear.
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it as a possible way of making more federal corporate regulation attractive to
those seriously concerned about increasing the caseload of the lower federal
courts. 62 It is because such a solution is likely to appeal to those so concerned
and because it seems so unprecedented and unwise that several arguments
against it will be presented.
I assume from Cary's use of the phrases "subject initially to state court
interpretation" and "ced[ing jurisdiction] to the state courts subject only to
review [by the United States courts of appeals] for purposes of establishing
uniform standards, ' 63 that under his scheme federal courts would not be
open to hear claims under federal corporate law. There are other interpreta-
tions of Cary's proposal, equally unprecedented and perhaps unworkable, but
these are devoid of serious problems of federalism. For example, the federal
courts might be closed off to claims under federal corporate law only in states
where the legislatures agreed (perhaps in exchange for federal compensation)
that their courts would shoulder the entire burden of deciding cases under
federal corporate law.
As I understand Cary's proposal, however, exclusive jurisdiction would be
imposed upon the state courts by federal legislation. Whether such jurisdic-
tion is unprecedented or not depends upon how one reads the precedents.
Prior to 1875 the lower federal courts had no general federal-question
jurisdiction; 64 during this period most of the legal claims which arose under
the few extant federal regulatory schemes were heard exclusively by the state
courts.6 5 Moreover, state courts are currently the only courts open to hear
some cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States in-
volving an amount in controversy of no more than $10,000.66 Federal district
62. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 15-33 (1973).
63. Cary, supra note 1, at 705.
64. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3503 at 9
(1975). This statement must be qualified by noting that for a period of slightly over a year begin-
ning in February 1801 and ending in March 1802, the United States circuit courts (courts having
both original and appellate jurisdiction) enjoyed trial jurisdiction over "all cases in law or equity
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and treaties made [thereunder] ..."
Act of February 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89. The repealing legislation was Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat.
132. The legislation restoring such federal-question jurisdiction was Act of March 3, 1875, 18
Stat. 470. Currently federal district courts have such jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331
(1970).
65. See, e.g., Lapham v. Almy, 95 Mass. 301 (1866); United States v. Smith, 4 N.J. L. (I South)
38 (1818).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (West Supp. 1977), the basic source of federal district court jurisdic-
tion over federal-question cases reads as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States except that no such
sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United States, any
agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in official capacity.
Unless some other more specialized federal-question statute is available (see note 47 supra), a case
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States but involving $10,000 or less
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courts are generally closed to such cases and presumably state courts have an
obligation to hear them. On several occasions the Supreme Court has re-
quired unwilling state courts to hear federal claims because the state courts'
refusals to do so were not based upon "valid excuses. '67 Valid excuses include
an application of traditional forum non conveniens6 8 doctrine and perhaps
the inability of state courts to hear similar cases arising under state law.6 9
Emphatically excluded from the category of valid excuses is a refusal to enter-
tain a federal cause of action solely because the underlying claim is based on
federal law.
7 1t
It is not hard to read these precedents, taken together, as establishing the
power of Congess to force state courts to assume jurisdiction not shared by
federal courts over all suits arising under a federal regulatory program. For
example, in 1958 the Supreme Court of New Mexico reached a similar view
of Congress' power.7 1 Citing the United States Supreme Court cases referred
to in the preceding paragraph, it declared 72 the following statute of that state,
passed in 1947, violative of the United States Constitution: 73
Jurisdiction of courts to enforce federal law restricted. No court of the state
of New Mexico shall have jurisdiction of, or enter any order or decree of any
character in any action instituted in the courts of this state, seeking to en-
force, directly or indirectly, any federal statute, or rule or regulation . . .
where the Congress of the United States has curtailed, withdrawn, or denied
in controversy generally can be brought only in state court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b) (1970)
a defendant can remove to federal court a federal-question case brought in state court only if the
plaintiff could have maintained the action in federal court originally.
67. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934);
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
68. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 279 U.S. 377. 387-88 (1929). See also Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386 (1947) (dictum).
69. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (dictum).
70. Id.; McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934).
71. Bourguet v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 65 N.M. 200 (1958), 334 P.2d 1107, 1110-11 (1958).
72. Id. (alternative holding). In the proceedings below in Bourguet, a state trial court dis-
missed a case against the railroad brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Its
dismissal was based upon the statute quoted in the text accompanying note 73 infra. The defen-
dant's argument was that the jurisdiction of federal district courts over FELA cases was restricted
within the meaning of the New Mexico statute. Despite the fact that plaintiffs were given an
option to bring damage suits in FELA cases to federal courts, defendant asserted that an absolute
prohibition upon removal by defendants constituted a restriction within the meaning of the New
Mexico statute. In a state-ground holding the court rejected such an interpretation of the New
Mexico statute, 65 N.M. at 201-03, 334 P.2d at 1108-09. Note the court had to determine
whether Congress has "curtailed withdrawn or denied jurisdiction," but because those are the
words of the New Mexico statute, the question is whether Congress has done so within the mean-
ing of that law. Id. In the alternative holding the court decides that the statute, applied to exclude
New Mexico courts, would violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 65
N.M. at 206, 334 P.2d at 1111. The court's rationale would seem to apply to the exclusion of any
federally created civil action, if not to all federally created actions.
The preceding description of Bourguet was presented for purposes of completeness. For pur-
poses of this article, the fact of primary interest is that the state legislature bridled at perceived
federal abuse.
73. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-7 (1953).
[Vol. 41 : No. 3
Page 146: Summer 1977]
the district courts of the United States the right to enforce such statutes, rules
or regulations aforesaid.
The New Mexico statute is evidence of the potential for friction in the
federal government's abuse of its partnership with state government. How-
ever, it probably does go too far in asserting states' rights. 4 If it is valid, state
courts are not obliged to hear those federal-question cases with amounts in
controversy of $10,000 or less which now cannot be maintained in federal
court. A plausible constitutional argument can however be made that the cur-
rent division of labor under the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement
and Cary's jurisdictional proposal are significantly different. Whether or not
the argument ultimately succeeds as a constitutional argument, it strongly
suggests the lack of wisdom of an exclusive state jurisdiction scheme. This
argument follows in the next several paragraphs.
All of the Supreme Court cases reversing as error state refusals to hear
federally created causes of action involved causes of action of a kind which
were concurrently cognizable in the federal courts.7 5 Those suits under fed-
74. The legislative history of § 16-1-7 is instructive:
Chapter 43 of Laws 1947 had a preliminary first section which read: "The legislature
of the state of New Mexico hereby finds that: (a) The Congress of the United States has
heretofore authorized, and may hereafter authorize, by congressional act, the courts of
the several states to entertain jurisdiction of and enforce causes of action created by or
arising from federal statutes, or by rules or regulations of federal regulating bodies or
agencies, and
"(b) The Congress has no power to require the state courts of the several states to take
cognizance of such actions, and
"(c) The Congress has from time to time, and may hereafter, withdraw from the courts
of the United States jurisdiction to enforce such statutes or rules or regulations aforesaid
or to entertain actions for such purpose or to enter judgments or decrees based there-
upon, and
"(d) In such event actions to enforce such statutes or rules or regulations aforesaid, or
rights or obligations arising therefrom may hereafter be instituted in the courts of this
state, burdening and taxing such courts, and placing upon the courts and people of the
state the burden and expense of enforcing such federal statutes, rules or regulations, or
settling disputes arising therefrom."
Title of Act.
An act relating to the jurisdiction of the state courts of New Mexico to enforce certain
federal statutes, rules and regulations under certain circumstances, and declaring an
emergency.-Laws 1947, ch. 43.
Emergency Clause.
Section 3 of ch. 43, Laws 1947 declared an emergency and provided that the act
should take effect upon its passage and approval. Approved March 8, 1947.
Compiler's notes to § 16-1-7, 4 N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 (1953).
75. The three cases in which such reversals occurred are listed in note 67 supra and are
discussed in the next paragraphs of this note.
McKnett, 292 U.S. 230 (1934), and Mondou, 223 U.S. 1 (1912), arose under the same version of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 34 Stat. 232 (1906), as amended by 35 Stat. 65 (1908)
and 36 Stat. 291 (1910) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 54, 56, 60). A reading of such
legislative history indicates (i) that private damage suits under the FELA were made explicitly
concurrently cognizable in state and federal courts by the 1910 amendments and (ii) that no
amount-in-controversy requirement ever existed.
Testa, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), arose under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, (EPCA), 56
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eral law which now can be heard exclusively in state court all involve causes of
action which can be brought in federal court as long as more than $10,000 is
in controversy.7 6 This pattern results in the federal government's sharing with
the states some of the judicial costs of each variety of legal action permitted
by each of its substantive programs, and consequently, also results in a practi-
cal restraint upon irresponsible (not cost justified) substantive laws. Recent
cases and scholarly commentary suggest that the Supreme Court may be rec-
ognizing a state sovereignty resistant to at least some otherwise permissible
federal regulation under the commerce clause. 77 It has been argued that a
congressional attempt to override the valid-excuse doctrine described above
might fail as an unconstitutional intrusion upon state sovereignty. 78 Perhaps
making the states bear all of the judicial costs of federal substantive programs
is another such intrusion.
Stat. 23 (1942) as amended by 56 Stat. 767 (1942), 57 Stat. 566 (1943), 58 Stat. 633 (1944), 59 Stat.
306-09 (1945), and 60 Stat. 664 (1946) (repealed 1947). A reading of such legislative history
indicates that during the existence of the EPCA, private damage suits thereunder were concur-
rently cognizable in state or federal court without regard to dollar amount.
76. Where jurisdiction is shared on a concurrent basis, the rights of plaintiffs and defendants
are not invariably symmetrical. For example, suits under the Securities Act of 1933 can be
brought at plaintiff's option in federal court regardless of the amount in controversy. If a plain-
tiff chooses instead to sue in state court in a case where federal jurisdiction could be based only
upon the presence of the Securities Act claim, the defendant has no removal action. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(v) (1970). The suits in McKnett and Mondou (see discussion in note 75 supra) were identical in
this respect to suits under the Securities Act, because suits against interstate railroads were not
(and are not) removable. Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291 (current version 28 U.S.C.
§ 1445 (1970)). Under this pattern, despite the restrictions upon removal, the federal courts do
share with the state courts the expenses of hearing causes of action under any portion of the
Securities Act.
77. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court found unconstitu-
tional that portion of the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which applied the
minimum wage laws to state and municipal public employees. The Court stated:
This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress to
override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to
regulate commerce which are conferred by Art. I of the Constitution.
426 U.S. at 842.
The Amendment (10th) expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to func-
tion effectively in a federal system.
Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). See also New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (dictum) (rejects proposition that federal government could
tax the states except to the extent that they carry on business as would private employers); Redish
& Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311, 340-59
(1976).
78. Id. Redish and Muench suggest that National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), forms the basis of an at least plausible argument that Congress would intrude on state
sovereignty if it were to attempt to override the valid-excuse doctrines which permit states to
refuse to entertain federal causes of action. Id. at 348-49, 358-59. The circumstances discussed by
Redish and Muench as possibly appropriate for state refusals involve nondiscriminatory applica-
tion of state rules of jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens. My argument is similar but
not identical. It is that mandatory exclusive state jurisdiction over federal causes of action is
plausibly another circumstance in which a state refusal to hear a federal cause of action would be
justified as protective of its sovereignty.
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There is strong evidence that at the time the Constitution was framed, it
was understood that the creation of lower federal courts was entirely at the
option of Congress 9 and that to the extent such courts were not available,
state courts were obliged to hear claims under federal law.8" Indeed, as men-
tioned above, lower federal courts were not generally available to hear such
claims until 1875. In a recent article Theodore Eisenberg8 ' argues that even if
lower federal courts were optional in 1789, changed circumstances result in
their being constitutionally required today. 82 His argument is that in the early
days of the Republic, the concept of Congress' power to dispense with lower
federal courts was not at war with the concept of the federal judiciary as
envisioned by the framers. 83 He argues that today, given the inability of the
Supreme Court to decide finally all questions of federal law raised in state
courts, those two concepts are at odds.8 4 The constitutional argument against
mandatory exclusive state jurisdiction over federal causes of action is structur-
ally similar to Eisenberg's. 5 Prior to the great expansion in federal legislative
power under the commerce clause,8 6 the concepts of state sovereignty and of
unlimited congressional power to use state courts as federal forums were not
incompatible. As the notion that the federal government is one of limited
powers has become less meaningful since the creation of the ICC in 1887,
there has developed a real potential for conflict.8 7 There seems to be no good
reason to challege the system of concurrent jurisdiction over federal-question
cases with which we have lived successfully for over a century. On the other
hand, can a departure from that system be justified if it permits the federal
government to use the state courts alone for the administration of any federal
law? The establishment of such a pattern seems not only a symbolic blow to
79. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 79-80
(1913); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49,
65-66 (1923).
80. See Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (1960).
81. Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498
(1974).
82. Without conceding that lower federal courts were ever dispensible, Eisenberg argues that,
in light of the current circumstances of the national judiciary, abolition of the lower federal
courts would violate an essential aspect of the framers' constitutional plan. Id. at 504-14.
83. Id. at 504, particularly n.38 and accompanying text.
84. Id.
85. Id. Of course, under any scheme of exclusive state-court trial jurisdiction over a system of
federal causes of action, some costs of judicial administration-the costs of deciding some
appeals-would be borne by federal courts. My argument is premised on the probability that the
costs of administering justice at the appellate level over a system of federal causes of action would
be relatively insignificant when compared with such costs at the trial-court level. Note also that in
cases where federal appellate courts had reviewed issues of federal corporate law decided by state
courts, the states presumably would have incurred costs themselves at the appellate level.
86. "Large scale regulatory action by Congress began with the Interstate Commerce Act in
1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Law in 1890. G. GUNTHER & W. DOWLING, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 240 (8th ed. 1965).
87. Id. See also R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 19 (1972).
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state sovereignty, but also an irresistible invitation to its own replication as a
means of reducing the federal costs of future federal programs.
Under prevailing circumstances it seems at least unfortunate, if not uncon-
stitutional, for the federal government to begin to insulate itself from the
judicial costs of its regulation and impose them entirely upon the courts of
the states. The New Mexico statute described above and never repealed by
the state legislature is tangible proof of the potential for state-federal friction
inherent in an exclusive state jurisdiction scheme.8 8
The remaining choice between some form of shared state-federal jurisdic-
tion and exclusive federal jurisdiction over cases under a new federal corpo-
rate law is the subject of the next subsection.
b. Choice Between Shared State-Federal and
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
Exclusive state-court jurisdiction over causes of action arising under a new
federal corporate law having been rejected as unsound, what is the most de-
sirable alternative? As has been noted, Congress can permit 89 and even
require"° state-court jurisdiction over federal causes of action, at least in cases
where that jurisdiction is shared with the federal courts on some reasonable
basis. Additionally, Congress can confer jurisdiction exclusively upon the fed-
eral courts, as it has previously done in the case of suits under certain federal
statutes. 9' In the usual case where no express jurisdictional limitation is pro-
vided for a federal cause of action, it is treated as cognizable in both the
federal and the state courts.92 In unusual circumstances, such a cause of ac-
tion will be found, by virtue of its "nature," to be excluded from state-court
88. The arguments against mandatory exclusive state jurisdiction presented above are all
grounded upon the concept of state sovereignty. Arguments made in the next section that exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction may be a desirable way of dealing with cases arising under certain por-
tions of new federal corporate regulation are, a fortiori, arguments against exclusive state juris-
diction over such cases.
Beyond this, even with respect to cases over which exclusive federal jurisdiction is not needed
because there will be little reviewable lawmaking (see notes 105-08 infra and accompanying text)
a removal option is necessary to protect plaintiffs against the promanagement biases described by
Cary. Cary, supra note 1, at 670-92. Car) concludes such biases would abate greatly were state
courts to apply federal law. Id. at 705. 1 am not sure the promanagement bias he ascribes to
Delaware judges is the product of legislative pressures as much as of lifelong perspectives. In any
event, as long as the states continue to charter and provide significant forums for the settlement
of intracorporate disputes of domestic corporations, management engaged in charter-state shop-
ping would undoubtedly prefer states whose judges read federal law through properly corrected
lenses. A liberal removal provision would dispense with these problems; exclusive state jurisdic-
tion would create them.
89. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
90. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
91. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866). See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970), confer-
ring upon lower federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising under the patent laws.
92. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876); Redish & Muench, supra note 77, at 312-25
(1976).
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cognizance. 3 How should a legislator contemplating federal regulation of na-
tional corporations decide between the concurrent and exclusive federal
modes of jurisdiction?
i. Benefits of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
A recent article by Redish and Muench offers guidance to courts which
are asked to decide, in the absence of an express provision dealing with juris-
diction, whether suits under a particular federal cause of action are to be
treated as exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 94 As an
alternative to the traditional legislative-historical approach, the article suggests
that courts engage in "creative judicial lawmaking," 95 and it further suggests
several factors bearing on the wisdom of a finding of exclusivity. 96 A creative
judicial lawmaker and his responsible congressional counterpart should be
concerned with many of the same problems in choosing a jurisdictional mode.
Consequently, the authors' analysis is helpful to our inquiry from a legislator's
perspective.
A major factor favoring exclusivity cited by Redish and Muench is that the
substantive law in question, in the absence of exclusive federal jurisdiction,
would be interpreted without uniformity among the states.9
In dealing with this factor, that of the possibility of disuniformity, the au-
thors conclude:
The most significant factor in this inquilry' is the nature of the federal statute
creating the particular cause of action. In other words, a court should deter-
mine whether the federal statute is likely to provide the judiciary wide
latitude in developing federal rights, or whether the cause of action is suffi-
ciently detailed in its scope and clear as to its purpose that the likelihood of
future judicial gloss is comparatively limited....
• . . [T]o the extent that a statutory right depends upon judicial develop-
ment for its content, the danger of legal chaos will vary directly with the num-
ber of courts independently interpreting the right. In light of the fact that an
overworked Supreme Court is capable of providing a uniform practice for
only a fraction of the numerous issues of federal law that arise each year, the
danger of divergent judicial interpretations must be taken seriously.
Such divergence is likely to be harmful for several reasons. First, to the
extent that varying or contrary interpretations are given in different areas of
the nation, the nationally unif'ing force of federal law is undermined, and
the post-Civil War development of federal supremacy over local interests is
weakened. Second, the arbitrariness of the enjoyment of federal rights that
this divergence would produce presents a significant moral problem .... Fi-
nally, in many cases the proliferation of judicial interpretations of a federal
right will unduly undermine the predictability in enforcement of that right,
thereby interfering with the often significant planning of primary commercial,
social, or personal conduct and decision-making.
93. 93 U.S. at 136; Redish & Muench, supra note 77, at 313-25.
94. Redish & Muench, supra note 77, at 311-40.
95. Id. at 329-40.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 331-33.
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Where, on the other hand, a federal statute is comparatively clear in its
directives, the danger of varying or contrary judicial interpretations is pre-
sumably reduced, even if the number of courts interpreting the right is
substantial.98
Any federal regulation of national corporations, whether it follows the
Cary model of partial regulation or the comprehensive federal chartering
model, might well contain vague standards defining the responsibility of man-
agement (and possibly controlling shareholders) to the general body of
shareholders. It is the vagueness of such standards which, in at least some
respects, render them useful: they are an invitation to courts to deal creatively
with a host of situations not foreseeable in advance. An example of such a
process of judicial lawmaking is the use made of rule lOb-5 99 by the lower
federal courts prior to Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores."'" In that case
the Supreme Court severely limited what had been described as the creation
of a general federal law of fiduciary responsibility. 1"
Some of the new federal corporation law envisioned by Sommer, Cary,
and others could involve an invitation from Congress to some courts for those
courts to engage in a process similar to the pre-Blue Chip Stamps process de-
scribed above." 2 It might seem then that any vaguely worded federal
98. Id.
99. Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), was pro-
mulgated by the Commission pursuant to section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b). It reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon an, person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any' security.
100. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
101. For the proposition that the development of such a federal corporate law was recognized
see, e.g., Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1146 (1965); Lowen-
fels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968);
Note, Standing Under Rule lOb-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MiCH. L. REV. 413, 414 (1976).
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), restricted the application of rule lOb-5 to transactions
involving a purchase or sale of securities. For a discussion of the erosion and occasional rejection
of the Birnbaum rule prior to Blue Chip Stamps, see Lowenfels, supra this note, and Note, supra this
note, at 427 n.94. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's endorsement of a stringent but still
imprecisely defined purchaser-seller rule in Blue Chip Stamps, see Note, supra this note, at 427-44.
The Note's author suggests that Blue Chip Stamps may be consistent with at least some of the prior
erosion of the purchaser-seller rule and may be truly significant only as a limitation upon future
erosion. Id. at 429.
102. In a 1974 speech, A.A. Sommer recognized that the benefits of at least some vagueness
in fiduciary standards could well be worth the resulting uncertainty costs:
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fiduciary standard should be interpreted only by the federal courts. In fact
more analysis is necessary.
Redish and Muench's argument turns upon the superiority of exclusive
federal jurisdiction as a unifier of federal law. Their explanation of such
superiority is as follows:
l °3
It'is true, of course, that even a finding of exclusive federal jurisdiction will
not insure uniformity of interpretation. Nevertheless, the likelihood of vary-
ing interpretations of federal law, both in terms of degree and occurrence, is
substantially reduced when only federal courts are making the interpretations.
Since there are only eleven courts of appeals which, though not bound by
decisions of other circuits, generally give them significant weight, and since a
common basis for the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari is the exis-
tence of a conflict among the circuits, the danger of proliferation is consider-
ably reduced.
Such an argument seems convincing," °4 but it is relevant only to the extent
that a vague standard invites judicial lawmaking in trial courts which is re-
I spoke of Rule lOb-5 being both fortunate and unfortunate. I think it is unfortunate
that we have, because of the circumstances that I mentioned, been impelled to load so
much on this Rule, which after all was admittedly adopted in haste, expressed with be-
wildering and sometimes even angering breadth and generality, and which is only 115
words long. Responsible commentators have suggested that it is wholly inappropriate for
the Commission and the courts to try to draw through some alchemy out of those few
words a whole code of conduct for the legal profession, the accounting profession, direc-
tors, corporate officers, insiders of all types, financial analysts and a host of other people.
It would perhaps indeed be better if through the debative process by which legislation is
developed greater particularity had become a part of this endeavor and perhaps it would
have been better if there had been at some point in time a more comprehensive realiza-
tion of what was being done, rather than a piecemeal, case-by-case manner of achieve-
ment that has characterized the growth of the Rule lOb-5 concept. While such an or-
dered structural development has much to commend it, I think there would also be
within that severe disadvantage: inflexibility. Social commentators have repeatedly
warned that the pace of change in our life is steadily accelerating and that our institu-
tions, our psyches and even our bodies must develop a capacity to change more quickly.
The corporate world is not immune to this rapidly accelerating pace of change and it is
extremely important that the means of social control of this terribly important part of
our national economic life be flexible and relatively swift reaction. Through Rule lOb-5 I
think we have accomplished a great deal of that flexibility and the ability to adapt that is
so necessary.
The price that is paid for such flexibility and adaptability of course, is the inability to
have a photographic rendition of the state of law at any given moment which is fixed,
clear, delineated, sharply focused and reliable.
Address by A.A. Sommer, American Bar Association 97th Annual Meeting (August 14, 1974),
reprinted in Hearings, supra note 1, at 72-73.
In other settings Mr. Sommer has indicated his view that it is better to deal with the respon-
sibilities of management of national corporations more directly by means of federal fiduciary
standards than by means of adapting laws designed principally to deal with trading abuses. Hear-
ings, supra note 1, at 65-66 (written statement prepared for submission at hearing). See also id. at
58. Presumably general federal fiduciary standards would also need to be somewhat flex-
ible.
103. Redish & Muench, supra note 77, at 332 n.88.
104. It should be noted that there is possibly an alternative method for unifying the law which
would not rely upon exclusive federal jurisdiction. The United States courts of appeals could be
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viewable by appellate courts and, consequently, is capable of being unified by
such courts. It is important not to assume that the vagueness of any fiduciary
standard will result in a large and constant amount of precedent-making
throughout its existence. Assume the following familiar rule is part of a
scheme of federal regulation:
Directors and officers shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in
good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise tinder similar circumstances in like positions.""
Would this rule result in a great deal of lawmaking? There would be ini-
tial questions about whether the standard resembled more an ordinary or a
gross negligence model. Once it is determined whether the standard of care
for corporate management is to resemble current lenient standards under
state law't t 6 or a more exacting standard, even some additional real lawmaking
might occur. For example, courts would determine whether certain familiar
recurrent omissions-e.g., missing directors' meetings-constitute per se viola-
tions of the standard. Perhaps in light of the need for uniformity, the fact
that this much lawmaking would result argues in favor of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. It seems likely, however, that most decisions applying such a law
given appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by state courts involving claims under federal cor-
porate law. Cary proposes such review as an adjunct to his scheme of exclusive state-court juris-
diction, presumably because he too perceives a need for law unification which Supreme Court
review can no longer fulfill. Cary, supra note 1, at 704-05. To the extent such review is considered
compatible with our federalism, it would work as well to mitigate uniformity problems generated
by concurrent state-federal jurisdiction over a body of cases.
It is tempting to look for constitutional infirmities of such a review system since, with the
possible but distinguishable exception of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over the cases of state
prisoners, nothing resembling lower-federal-court review of state-court cases has existed in our
federal system. The few judges and scholars who have considered such review in the abstract,
however, conclude it is constitutional. See Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal
Questions: The Need for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CAL. L. REV. 943, 945-48 (1976). While
possibly constitutional, such a system of review would be an extraordinarily controversial means
of assuring uniformity. This article proceeds upon the assumption that such a system is unlikely.
105. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 1963). The transactions which such a corpora-
tion may avoid on the ground of unfairness are those Which involve an interested director and
which have not been insulated from such a power of avoidance by means of the approval of a
disinterested majority of fully informed directors or by means of shareholder approval.
106. The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held
liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a
very small number of needles in a very large haystack. Few are the cases in which the
stockholders do not allege conflict of interest, still fewer those among them which
achieve even such partial success as denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss the com-
plaint. Still, it cannot be denied that there is a small number of relatively recent cases
which do seem to lend a modicum of substance to the fears of directors of industrial or
mercantile corporations that they may be stuck for what they like to call "mere" or "hon-
est" negligence. My own collection, based on extensive (although not exhaustive) investi-
gation, includes four such specimens.
Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 1968). See also Cary, supra note 1, at 683-84; Address by A.A.
Sommer, supra note 102, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 1, at 61, 75-76.
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will be analogous to decisions generally requiring a determination of whether
particular conduct was negligent; they will involve the application of its vague
standard of care to situations which are sui generis and therefore not of great
precedential effect." 7 Another example of a vague standard not having a
great capacity to generate hard legal precedents is that of a provision which
permits a corporation to avoid certain transactions to which it is a party and
in which one of its directors has an interest unless it is demonstrated affirma-
tively that the transaction is fair and reasonable." 8 The rules as to what is a
sufficient interest to trigger the statute's application can be made reasonably
clear and therefore could be the subject of relatively little reviewable judicial
lawmaking. Decisions about the fairness and reasonableness of various trans-
actions would, for the most part, involve sui generis and unreviewable deter-
mination of mixed questions of law and fact.
On the other hand, if, for example, Congress were to write a regulation
requiring that management and controlling shareholders of a corporation deal
fairly with those holding noncontrolling equity interests, years of true judicial
lawmaking would ensue. 10 9 Perhaps this is an argument for Congress to at-
tempt clearer and more specific standards which would provide fairer notice
to those subject to new duties.""
The primary thrust of this analysis is that when Congress considers alloca-
tion of jurisdiction with respect to any statutory scheme, it should hear expert
testimony on the type of adjudication that each significant position is likely to
spawn. If after such careful consideration, Congress concludes that the flexi-
bility of a standard vague as to persons or activities aimed at is worth the
uncertainty generated, it should then seriously consider exclusive federal
jurisdiction for suits brought under such standard."' The greater the possibil-
ity that reviewable lawmaking will be done by the courts, the greater the ben-
efits of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
107. In describing the relationship between the fact-finding and the law-declaring processes in
negligence actions, Professor Francis Bohlen stated:
The jury has no power to declare the law, using that term in the sense above stated.
But since it is impossible to anticipate the innumerable combinations of circumstances
which may arise, it is impossible for the law to formulate in advance definite standards
by which the propriety of conduct under every conceivable set of circumstances may be
judged. It can at best announce broad general principles, which give the materials and
general directions for the construction of the standard to be applied in each specific case.
Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 113 (1925). See also Address by
A.A. Sommer, supra note 102, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 1, at 76-77, suggesting that, while
traditional notions of degrees of fault seem obsolete, fiduciary standards for management must
be based upon the Gestalt of the relationship between the parties. Sommer does however suggest
that fiduciary standards be made at least somewhat more specific. Id.
108. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963).
109. See Kaplan, Fiduciaiy Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 883,
907-10 (1976).
110. See NADER, supra note 1, at 104.
111. A.A. Sommer describes the tradeoff nicely. See note 102 supra.
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ii. Costs of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
Assuming a provision of federal corporate law is likely to result in a great
deal of judicial lawmaking and is a candidate for exclusive federal jurisdiction,
what are the costs against which the benefits of uniformity are to be weighed?
Jurisdiction of suits under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is exclu-
sively federal." 2 There are suggestions that this exclusive jurisdiction under
the Securities Exchange Act has caused serious problems of efficiency, par-
ticularly in the area of proxy regulation. Citing Professor Loss' discussion of
such difficulties, the current tentative draft of the American Law Institute's
Federal Securities Code opts in favor of concurrent state-federal jurisdiction
over most suits under its provisions which are of the sort currently arising
under the Securities Exchange Act.1 13 The most severe difficulty cited by
Loss and presumably troubling those drafting the Securities Code is the pos-
sibility that in the context of a particular case, no court, state or federal, could
grant relief with respect to all of a plaintiff's claims arising out of one set of
factual transactions."l 4 At the time Loss wrote, it was possible for state and
federal claims to arise out of a common nucleus of fact and yet, in some
circumstances, for a federal court to consider itself without power to hear the
state-law claims on a pendent jurisdiction theory. As a result, a plaintiff might
need to bring two actions to assert all of his rights arising from one set of
facts. 1 5 Additionally, even if a federal court had pendent jurisdiction over all
of a plaintiff's state-law causes of action, multiple suits could result from the
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78 aa (1970).
113. ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
183-84 (1969).
114. Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (1960). Two major sorts
of difficulties are described by Loss. The first is the difficulty that any court, state or federal, will
often have in determining the relationship between the state and federal laws that together gov-
ern the process of shareholder voting (both as to directors and on referenda) with respect to the
affairs of national corporations. Such problems of fit between federal and state laws are discussed
later in this article. The second problem, the one described in the text, is the problem of plain-
tiffs' need to sue twice to vindicate all their rights, a need which results from a combination of (i)
cooperative state-federal substantive regulation with (ii) exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims
under federal law, and (iii) the inability of federal courts to grant all the relief under state law
which is available in the state courts.
Given the fact that characteristics (i) and (iii) are currently features of our system of regulation,
exclusive federal jurisdiction generates the costs described by Loss. Depending upon one's view of
the magnitude of uniformity benefits of exclusive federal jurisdiction in the proxy area, it could
be entirely proper to reject exclusive federal jurisdiction as not cost-justified.
The continued vitality of characteristic (iii) is at least somewhat in question. See notes 117-123
infra and accompanying text. To the extent that it is no longer a factor, one suit in federal court
will suffice to vindicate all of a plaintiff's rights. Additionally, Congress may well be able to
further cure the need for bifurcation. See notes 119 & 121 infra and accompanying text.
Beyond this, if state law were entirely preempted by a federal law regulating the shareholder
voting process of national corporations, state-created rights would not exist and a federal court
with exclusive jurisdiction could grant all the relief which could be obtained in any forum.
115. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); see the description of Hurn's test in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 721-24 (1966).
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inability of that court to grant remedies provided for by state law which are
different from those permitted to the federal courts. I" 6
The former difficulty has been ameliorated by a Supreme Court case,
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs," I7 which was decided after Loss wrote his origi-
nal critique. This case permits federal courts, in their discretion, to entertain
pendent state claims at least (1) when they arise from a core of operative facts
common to the federal claim and (2) where under the circumstances a plain-
tiff would be expected to join the claims in one lawsuit. I 8 Assuming the nar-
rowest view of pendent jurisdiction under Gibbs,' l part of the efficiency costs
of exclusive federal jurisdiction of suits brought under any federal law will be
that a plaintiff will have to bring a separate state-court suit where either (1) or
(2) above is not satisfied. These efficiency costs would continue to be ap-
preciable, as Professor Loss makes clear in his current supplement.12 ° Such
problems of multiplicity, however, are clearly not as severe as those which
seemed possible when Loss first discussed the problems of exclusive federal
jurisdiction: the simultaneous prosecution of a state and a federal lawsuit aris-
ing from identical or substantially overlapping facts. Additionally, Congress
could expand the scope of pendent jurisdiction in cases arising under federal
corporate law, permitting all theories to be joined in one suit at the expense
of more federal courts' time spent on state-law claims.' 2 1
The other difficulty described above involves the power of federal courts
to grant relief under state law which would not otherwise be available under
federal law. 1 22 There may still be limitations upon the power of federal courts
in diversity cases to grant a remedy novel to them but provided for by state
law.' 23 Such a limitation could result in duplicative judicial effort. Even with
116. Loss, supra note 114, at 1278-84.
117. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
118. Id. at 724-25.
119. The question still open under Gibbs is whether both requirements (i) and (ii) described in
the text above must be met in order for pendent jurisdiction to be available or whether either will
suffice. See Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. PITT. L.
REv. 759, 764-65 (1972).
120. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2962-76 (vol. V 1969 Supp. to vol. I1 1961).
121. While there might be legitimate debate about the constitutional limitation upon pendent
jurisdiction, a strong argument can be made that, to the extent that lack of pendent jurisdiction
would constitute a severe deterrent to the use of a federal forum for a federal claim, there is
justification for such jurisdiction. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 922-23 (2d ed. 1973).
122. See Loss, supra note 114, at 1278-84.
123. There seems to have been some amelioration of this difficulty as well. There are sugges-
tions that in a diversity case, federal courts can grant remedies provided by state law even where
such remedies are not otherwise available in federal court. Susquehanna Corp. v. General Refrac-
tories Co., 250 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (dictum), aff'd in part per curiam, 356 F.2d 985 (3d
Cir. 1966). Loss' argument is itself a powerful authority favoring federal courts' power in diversity
cases to use state remedies. At a minimum, federal courts seem capable of adapting clearly per-
missible federal remedies to approximate relief available under state law. See Stern v. South Ches-
ter Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606 (1968); Susquehanna Corp., supra this note. See generally L. Loss, SE-
URITIES REGULATION, supra note 120, 2958-59.
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respect to wrongs arising out of the same factual transactions, some relief may
be available only from state courts, while any relief under federal law gener-
ally would be available only from federal courts. 24 Even if one assumes the
continued existence of such limitations, they, like the court-defined scope of
pendent jurisdiction, would yield to congressional action. Congress could, for
example, provide that with respect to any claim for relief under state corpo-
rate law properly before a federal district court as pendent to a claim under
federal corporate law, the federal court may order any remedy available to a
court of the state whose substantive law governs the claim.1 25 The resulting
costs of such a statute would be the extra judicial costs of providing whatever
relief would have been unavailable in federal court prior to the expansion of
remedies.
iii. Some Conclusions: A Trial Period of Exclusivity
There seem to be few arguments for exclusive federal jurisdiction over
suits under any particular federal corporation law if (1) its directives provide
little interpretive leeway or (2) its directives, while vague, require a court
principally to determine mixed questions of law and fact. With respect to
those federal standards which contemplate a great deal of judicial lawmaking,
Congress should seriously consider exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Two sorts of costs which must be weighed against the benefits of exclusive
federal jurisdiction are (1) the increased workload which results from sharing
none of the burden with state courts 6 and (2) the possibility that exclusive
jurisdiction would result in two suits, one state, one federal, in instances
where one suit in either forum would have sufficed had jurisdiction been
concurrent. Not only has the latter difficulty been ameliorated significantly by
judicial decision, but it is likely that Congress could virtually eliminate it. The
cost of such a solution would be an increase in the time the lower federal
courts spend hearing state-law claims.
Ultimately it is such an increase in the workload of the lower federal
courts along with that caused directly by the absence of alternative state
forums which Congress must weigh against the uniformity benefits described
above.
124. Loss, supra note 114, at 1250. But it is arguable that the states might use federal duties as
the basis of state-created causes of action. Id. at 1263-77.
125. It seems impossible to construct an argument that Congress could not, if it so desires,
permit or even require the federal courts to grant a traditionally judicial remedy, available in the
state courts, for state-law claims properly before those courts pursuant to diversity or pendent
jurisdiction.
126. It could be argued that this cannot legitimately be considered a cost and that Congress
should be willing to provide sufficient federal judicial resources to administer litigation under its
substantive programs. From a congressional perspective, however, the possibility that some of the
federal-question caseload will be absorbed by the state courts could naturally be viewed as a
benefit. In any event such a sharing is frequently described as a legitimate end. See Redish &
Muench, supra note 77, at 334.
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If these costs and benefits seem too difficult to weigh in the abstract,
perhaps the best way to decide about federal exclusivity is to decide after
having some experience with both the quantity of litigation and the kinds of
legal issues generated by each new federal regulation. This seems workable in
the case of the limited federal intrusion envisioned by Cary. Jurisdiction over
all claims arising under the new federal corporate law could be made exclu-
sively federal for a period of seven years.' 7 The expiration of the seven-year
period would provide an occasion for considering the exclusivity issue on the
basis of the data amassed. 2 8 Additionally, although seven years would surely
not be long enough for the federal courts to have answered definitively all
major questions tinder the new federal law, the lower federal courts would
have at least begun to give it shape.
Under a scheme of federal regulation more comprehensive than Cary's, it
seems important to attempt a jurisdictional solution at the outset. The prob-
lems peculiar to more comprehensive regulation are discussed in the next
section.
2. Special Problems of Comprehensive Federal Regulation
The discussion in part A above is for the most part germane to questions
of allocation of jurisdiction under either partial or comprehensive federal
regulation of national corporations. The material that follows in this section
deals with issues which are peculiar to a program of federal chartering and
comprehensive regulation. If the current system of state regulation of na-
tional corporations were modified by the very limited scheme suggested by
Cary,121 the respective chartering states would continue to provide almost all
of the law governing such corporations' internal affairs and appropriate
forums for hearing disputes under such law. Under a scheme of exclusive
federal chartering and regulation of national corporations like that proposed
by A. A. Sommer, a"" other problems arise.
a. Exclusive Federal Chartering-Choice-of-Forum Difficulties
Under a scheme of exclusive federal chartering and comprehensive regu-
lation coupled with concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts, questions about
appropriate state forums arise. There no longer would be a state of incorpo-
127. Such self-terminating laws have been referred to as "sunset laws." See Adams, Sunset: A
Proposalfor Accountable Government, 28 AD. LAW REV. 511 (1976).
128. Of course it would be impossible at the end of such period to compare the effects of
exclusive federal jurisdiction with those of concurrent jurisdiction, since the latter would not have
been tried. It seems to me that the magnitude of the uniformity benefits is more predictable than
that of the increase in pressure on the federal courts. A seven-year period of exclusivity would
provide a better understanding of the latter.
129. For the substantive features of his proposal see note 57 supra.
130. See note 59 supra.
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ration for each national corporation. Under these circumstances, and assuming
a congressional desire to spare the federal courts some of the burdens of suits
under federal law, which states may, or even must, open their courts to suits
to enforce the charter rights of shareholders of such a corporation? For ex-
ample, what would be an appropriate state forum to hear a suit to compel
payment of dividends to preferred shareholders of a national corporation?
No state has a truly unique interest in the controversy. A preponderance-of-
the-shareholders test, or a principal-place-of-business test are not only arbi-
trary but would require determinations that may be too difficult to make
and in any event result in a potential for a frequent change of appropriate
state forum. The most workable method of providing concurrent state-federal
jurisdiction mandatory upon the states would be for a statute to provide that
each national corporation certify the identity of its headquarters state to a
federal agency and to expressly provide that the courts of that state have
mandatory concurrent jurisdiction over suits under federal corporate law in-
volving that corporation. It is not clear that the federal government has the
power to use state courts in this way." a ' Even if Congress could create such
concurrent jurisdiction it seems unwise for it to do so under a federal charter-
ing scheme. States are free to permit their courts to refuse on the grounds of
forum non conveniens to consider questions involving the internal affairs of
corporations chartered by other states. When courts so refuse, the effect is to
force such litigation back to the chartering state, which alone can charge such
a corporation taxes without regard to the amount of its business or property
in the state.1 3 2 Unless, under federal chartering, headquarters states were
permitted to charge for the headquartering privilege as states can now charge
for the expenses they bear as chartering states, the net result would be a
redistribution of wealth to the federal government.
A. A. Sommer's proposal for exclusive federal chartering and total pre-
emption of state law would structurally resemble the current state enabling
model and would presumably create in shareholders of national corporations
at least all of the individual rights now enjoyed by them under most state
laws.1 3 3 As discussed earlier, under 28 U.S.C. 1337 suits brought to enforce
rights conferred by federal statute and most probably those to enforce rights
granted by the federal corporate charters could be brought in federal court
131. To the extent that a state's courts refused on forum non conveniens grounds to hear
suits involving the internal affairs of foreign-state-chartered corporations, its courts could perhaps
invoke that doctrine as a valid excuse for refusing to hear cognate suits involving federally char-
tered corporations. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. Note that state-court refusals to
entertain federal causes of action found to rest upon a valid excuse all involved congressional
silence as to the duty of the states to hear them. It is, however, an open question whether Con-
gress can override an otherwise valid excuse. See Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1950); Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. RR., 279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929).
132. See notes 23 and 24 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 59supra.
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regardless of the amount in controversy. 13 4 Beyond the implication for indi-
vidual plaintiffs with small claims, civil actions could proceed on behalf of
classes of shareholders regardless of the fact that some members, indeed that
all members, had claims not in excess of $10,000.135
A Congress considering preemption of state corporation laws with respect
to national corporations would need to consider how to deal with such small
claims. As we have seen, doing nothing would most likely result in federal
original jurisdiction concurrent with state courts and unlimited by jurisdic-
tional amount.
Frivolous shareholder suits against management to obtain coercive relief
-e.g., to inspect books and records,' 3 6 to enjoin ultra vires acts,' 37 and to
correct wrongs with respect to shareholder voting' 38 --could be particularly
vexatious.
Perhaps the best way of avoiding many of the difficulties described above
would be to provide for a large measure of exclusive federal jurisdiction di-
vided between a federal administrative agency and the federal courts. Federal
chartering would necessarily entail the use if not the creation of an adminis-
trative agency to deal with such matters as recording charter amendments.
Such an agency could also be given a judicial role. To avoid the familiar prob-
lem of agency coziness with those regulated, federal courts could entertain
suits requesting large amounts of money damages or nonmonetary relief on
behalf of those representing a reasonably large percentage of securities of any
relevant class. Suits seeking shareholder lists and other suits for nonmonetary
relief pressed against management by those representing a fairly small per-
centage of securities in any class would be decided initially by the agency. The
appropriate U.S. court of appeals would review only determinations of law.
Suits to recover small sums of money might be dealt with in the same fashion or
farmed out to the states, provided the problem of the choice of the appro-
priate state forum described above had been dealt with. Depending upon the
location of agency offices, a shareholder might indeed be forced to travel a
great distance to obtain coercive relief against actions of management which
violate charter rights. This would not involve a change for the worse. Today
shareholders often must travel a great distance to obtain such relief under
state law.
b. Exclusive Federal Chartering-Diversity Jurisdiction
If federal regulation of national corporations were to entail the substitu-
tion of a federal certificate of incorporation for the state certificate currently
134. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624 (McKinney 1963).
137. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 203 (McKinney 1963).
138. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 619 (McKinney 1963).
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held by each corporation, the result under the existing diversity jurisdiction-
conferring statute would most likely be the elimination of diversity jurisdiction
over suits to which such corporations are parties.
A literal reading of 28 U.S.C., section 1332(c), hardly compels such a result:
"For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a corporation
shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and
of the State where it has its principal place of business. ... From such text
alone one could argue plausibly that national corporations would retain citi-
zenship in the state of their principal place of business even though there
would no longer be any state of incorporation. Courts which have grappled
with virtually identical issues, however, have decided otherwise. 3 9 They have
noted that the addition in 1958 of the possibility of a second citizenship in a
corporation's principal place of business was designed to cut back on diversity
jurisdiction by creating the possibility of identity of citizenship between a cor-
poration and the citizens of an additional state in which parochial bias against
the corporation is unlikely.14 This purpose of creating additional domiciles is
violated when instead of limiting the possibility of diversity jurisdiction against
a true state-citizen corporation, the principal-place-of-business domicile is
used as the only ground of the statute's applicability. If, as is likely, an exclu-
sively federally chartered corporation would be treated as a citizen of no state
under section 1332, then that section's complete diversity requirement would
never be satisfied in an action where the corporation is a necessary party.1 4 '
139. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. National Surety Corp., 345 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Iowa
1972), holding that the Disabled American Veterans, a federally chartered corporation, not
domiciled by Congress in a particular state, is the citizen of no state for diversity purposes, not
even the state where it has a principal place of business. See also Rice v. Disabled American
Veterans, 295 F. Supp. 131, 132-34 (D.D.C. 1968).
If the United States Government had owned more than one-half of the stock of the federal
corporation involved in either of the two cases described in the preceding paragraph, a special
jurisdictional provision would have created federal jurisdiction regardless of diversity of citizen-
ship or the presence of a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1970).
140. 345 F. Supp. at 887; 295 F. Supp. at 134.
141. The statement in the text refers to all suits by or against business corporations chartered
exclusively by the federal government, not solely to suits under federal corporate law. Under
existing statutes, a federal court can never have diversity jurisdiction with respect to that portion
of a lawsuit involving a party who is neither a citizen of a particular state nor of a foreign nation.
See Fahrner v. Gentzsch, 355 F. Supp. 349, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1972); See WRIGHT, supra note 64,
§ 3621 at p. 756 n.5 and accompanying text. It is clear that the citizenship of such a party can
never be used to create diversity. Id. Can such a stateless United States citizen be an additional
party to a suit between other parties whose citizenship pattern otherwise satisfies the require-
ments of § 1332 (a)(1) or (a)(2)? The Fahrner court permitted such a person to continue as a party
plaintiff but only on the theory that his claim was pendent to claims asserted in a suit which
otherwise met the requirements of § 1332 (a)(2). 355 F. Supp. at 353-54.
It is, however, clear that pendent jurisdiction would at best only occasionally make available
diversity jurisdiction over a suit involving a stateless national corporation holding only a federal
charter. First, where such a corporation is the only possible plaintiff or defendant there can be no
diversity, because (i) neither § 1332(a)(1) nor (2) is satisfied (see Kaufman and Broad, Inc. v.
Gootrad, 397 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Fahrner at 353), and (ii) there is no diversity action
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In the current climate, as evidenced by the legislative history of the 1958
amendments to section 1332,142 by American Law Institute proposals to cut
back diversity jurisdiction,'14 and by recently proposed legislation, 44 it is pos-
sible that Congress would be delighted with the contraction of diversity juris-
diction which would result from combining federal chartering with extant sec-
tion 1332. Nevertheless, a Congress considering a federal chartering scheme
should advert to the probable result of its inaction. To avoid otherwise inevita-
ble litigation, Congress, if it desires such constriction of diversity jurisdiction,
should include as a part of any federal chartering law a clear declaration that
a federally chartered corporation is a citizen of no state for purposes of diver-
sity jurisdiction. Congress' authority to do so is unquestionable. 45 If on the
other hand Congress wishes to retain diversity jurisdiction over national cor-
porations, it should so indicate expressly. While some may doubt Congress'
power to make a federally chartered corporation a state citizen for diversity
purposes, those doubts seem ill founded. 46 Perhaps, as in current American
Law Institute proposals, the best solution would be for Congress to permit
federal diversity jurisdiction over suits by or against national corporations in
carefully defined situations where discrimination against such corporations
seems plausible.
147
among other parties to which such a corporation's claim might be appended. Second, even where
an action might continue among other parties who satisfy the requirements of § 1332, the avail-
ability of pendent jurisdiction in diversity cases is by no means settled. Cf. Seyler v. Steuben
Motors, Inc., 462 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1972).
142. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 3101-03 (1958).
143. ALl, supra note 113, at 12-13, 125-30.
144. See H.R. 761, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) currently pending before the House of Repre-
sentatives and proposing the abolition of federal district court diversity jurisdiction. Recently the
members of the Judicial Conference of the United States independently proposed the abolition of
such jurisdiction. See release data March 11, 1977, of the Public Information Office of the
United States Courts.
145. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850), affirms great power in Congress to limit the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to less than that which might be given under article III of
the United States Constitution.
In 1809 the Supreme Court held that corporations are citizens of no state. Bank of United
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). In 1844 the Court began treating corporations as
citizens of their chartering states. Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
Although the rationale for such treatment has shifted somewhat over the years, the net effect of
the Letson case has remained constant. For an interesting discussion of judicial difficulties with the
notions of the corporate person's state citizenship see WRIGHT, supra note 37 at 101.
146. The argument that there are limits upon Congress' power to expand diversity jurisdic-
tion by redefining state citizenship is not entirely frivolous. Article III of the Constitution must
impose some limitations. For example, it is unthinkable that the words "citizens of states" in
article III are sufficiently broad to permit Congress to expand diversity jurisdiction by designat-
ing a person or a corporation a citizen of a state with which he or it has no contact. On the other
hand it seems likely that article Ill would be read to permit Congress' designating an exclusively
federally chartered corporation a citizen of the state where it is headquartered or where it has a
principal place of business.
147. ALI, supra note 113, at 13, 125-30. Note that the current proposal prohibits a corpora-
tion from invoking diversity (either originally or by removal) in a state where it has certain sub-
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II
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW: PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY ARISING
FROM THE FIT BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
As discussed in the introduction, the structural inelegance of the current
system of state regulation of national corporations is by itself an insufficient
reason for change. From the perspective of various critics of the substance of
state corporate law, however, the benefits of some federal intrusion are clear.
Should one consider problems of federalism in determining the scope of any
proposed federal intrusion?
From a federal perspective, the possible costs of any scheme of federal
regulation are (1) the inevitable initial costs of designing and creating a new
regulatory scheme, (2) the continuing costs of running such a scheme, and (3)
the intangible injury to federalism caused by federal intrusion into an area
formerly regulated by the states. In the case of regulation of national corpora-
tions, only potential costs (1) and (2) seem worth considering. There are good
arguments that federalism often requires that Congress decline to exercise the
legislative power it possesses under the commerce clause. Many local ac-
tivities having national impact also have a particularly strong local impact as
well. Given the vastness of commerce clause power, if the states are to be
more than administrative arms of the federal government, some congressional
restraint is necessary. Additionally, there is often an independent federal in-
terest in permitting the states to serve as laboratories testing the results of
different legislative approaches to similar problems.
Choosing federal restraint based upon federalism in the case of possible
federal regulation of national corporations, however, is to apply deferential
federalism where it is least justified. 4 The federal interest in regulating the
internal affairs of such corporations is obviously great. With respect to a na-
tional corporation, no state has a special and legitimate interest in regulating
the various relationships among its management and shareholders. As dis-
cussed above, the chartering state's only interest is in selling its local law to
govern this most national of all contractual relationships. Such an interest is
obviously entitled to no weight at all against the great federal interest de-
scribed above. Finally, is a federal interest served by permitting the
laboratory-states a few more experiments? From the perspective of greater
management accountability-that of the proponents of federal incorpora-
tion-the experimentation would seem to have run a long and useful course.
From that viewpoint, there seems to be no need to hold up federal legislation,
otherwise quite justifiable by means of a state- and federal-interest calculus,
solely on the ground that some good ideas might emerge from a further
period of state regulation.
stantial contacts. Id. Diversity could be further restricted by prohibiting the invocation of diver-
sity jurisdiction against a corporation in such a jurisdiction.
148. But see NADER, supra note 1, at 240.
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The remaining costs of comprehensive federal regulation which are of
legitimate concern to a federal legislator are those of starting and running the
regulatory program. It is difficult to estimate the costs in dollars of any par-
ticular regulatory program. Were figures available, each reader would still
have to weigh them according to his own system of values against the ben-
efits of increased fairness. Instead of attempting this impossible calculus, I
want to assume that the difficult decision has been made in favor of a certain
amount of federal regulation and discuss how the regulation can be made
most efficient from a judicial perspective.
We have seen in an earlier portion of this article that chaos would have
been the result if states had not practiced informal federalism by generally
choosing to apply the law of the state of incorporation to govern the internal
affairs of foreign corporations appearing in their courts. 149 The chaos would
have resulted from the application of different but parallel laws to different
portions of a transaction which could be regulated reasonably only by means
of one set of coherent rules.
Partial federal preemption of the regulation of national corporations raises
no such problems. To be sure, partial preemption involves the existence of
two sets of laws-one state, one federal-both regulating conduct within a
substantive area. The difference between multiple regulation by several states
and joint state and federal regulation is that with respect to the latter there is
truly only one set of laws. It is made up of an amalgam of state and federal
law, but it is internally consistent. 15" The existence of a conflict between the
law of a state of incorporation and a federal regulation and the proper reso-
lution of such a conflict would be determined by federal law.
While the relationship between state and federal law would get worked out
in each case, the expenses of nonpreemption are the judicial expenses of
working out the relationship. Consequently, the costs are greatest where there
are alternative plausible ways of viewing the relationship between state and
federal law.
One good example explored by Professor Loss is the complex relationship
between state law governing the shareholder franchise and the federal proxy
rules. 1" Professor Loss has discussed in detail the difficult judicial decisions
which have been and may be occasioned by the necessity of determining the
proper fit between state and federal law in this complex area.' 5 2
A simpler example of such problems of fit can be found in Professor
149. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
150. The law which governs daily living in the United States is a single system of law; it
speaks in relation to any particular question with only one ultimately authoritative voice,
however difficult it may be on occasion to discern in advance which of two or more con-
flicting voices really carries authority. In the long run and in large, this must be so.
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954).
151. See Loss, supra note 114.
152. Id.
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Cary's proposal to require by federal law that certain provisions be inserted in
the state-issued charters of national corporations.. 3 Is the breach of such a
provision a violation of state or of federal law? 15 4 Regardless of which law is
found to create the duties, is the remedy for a breach of such a duty to be
determined by federal or by state law? Can a violation of such a provision be
ratified by the shareholders? If so, will federal law or state law determine
what is a valid ratification? Ultimately, without legislative guidance, the fed-
eral courts would answer such questions of fit between state and federal laws
which clearly continue to operate together but in a way only vaguely if at all
suggested by federal statute.
Congress could, however, save courts and litigants time and trouble by
spelling out clearly and in advance the more important features of the con-
templated relationship. In regulating the internal affairs of national corpora-
tions, because no strong state interest justifies deferential federalism, the sim-
plest way to spell out the relationship is for Congress to preempt completely
the law in a convenient area.
The same problems can arise in substantive areas other than those dis-
cussed immediately above. Should federal fiduciary standards be minimum
standards in the sense that more stringent state laws are not preempted?
5 5
This pattern works well where federal objectives are clear, limited, and quan-
tifiable. In the area of pollution control, Congress requires of industries in all
states a quantifiable level of cleanliness, but permits states to require even
more. 156 A fiduciary standard, on the other hand, represents an attempt to
vindicate not only vague but diverse substantive ends. Even if the question is
how much care is required of a director, it is possible to harm the national
shareholder constituency of a corporation by requiring either too much or too
little from corporate managers. While it may not seem realistic to assume that
states would impose more exacting standards, litigants will nevertheless so
argue. Why should federal courts have to concern themselves with the rela-
tionship between state and federal law in the area of no legitimate localized
interest? Again, the proper solution seems to be a thorough federal preemp-
tion of a conveniently isolable area of regulation.
One might, I suppose, attempt an argument that corporate regulation is
such an interlocking system that total preemption is necessary because none of
its parts is truly isolable. This seems untenable. The partial regulation de-
scribed above-for example, Professor Cary's proposal-seems to involve sub-
153. See note 57 supra.
154. Cf. Loss, supra note 114, at 1263-77.
155. Professor Kaplan suggests such a minimum federal standard pattern. Kaplan, supra note
1, at 481.
156. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. II 1972) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857d-l (1970) (Clean Air Act of 1970); 42 U.S.C.A. § 6929 (Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976).
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stantive areas which are reasonably isolable from other corporate regulation.
Occasional unforeseeable problems of fit may occur in any scheme of partial
preemption; what is important is to avoid those which are foreseeable.
The suggested approach is for the legislature to think much more care-
fully about the potential interaction of state and federal law. Beyond this, the
suggestion is that when Congress is partially regulating in an area of no
legitimate state interest, it should clearly eliminate some of the most foresee-
able and troublesome potential connections between its regulation and state
laws. One device helping to accomplish this would be a provision to accom-
pany any scheme of partial federal regulation. It might read as follows:
Sections - through - of this title preempt state laws govern-
ing the same subject matter and are to be construed liberally to effec-
tuate their purposes. The following determinations shall be made sole-
ly according to federal law determined by the courts in accordance
with the purposes of this title:
(a) the nature and scope of the rights and duties created by or
recognized under such sections;
(b) the identity of beneficiaries of rights, or the objects of duties,
created by or recognized under such sections;
(c) the existence, nature and scope of any cause of action created
by or recognized under such sections or of any' defense
thereto;
(d) the waiver of any rights created by or recognized under such
sections; and
(e) the existence, nature, and scope of any remedy for the viola-
tion of any right or the breach of any duty created or recog-
nized under such sections.
In determining the federal law contemplated by this section the laws
of the several states may be considered but shall be without binding
effect.
While such a provision would enlarge the area on the federal side of the
inevitably blurred line which separates state and federal regulation, I believe it
would help bring that line into somewhat sharper focus.
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